From 35fcb982ea16c40619fee8bba4789a94d824521e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrew Cooper Date: Thu, 31 May 2018 16:57:47 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] x86/VT-x: Fix printing of EFER in vmcs_dump_vcpu() This is essentially a "take 2" of c/s 82540b66ce "x86/VT-x: Fix determination of EFER.LMA in vmcs_dump_vcpu()" because in hindight, that change was more problematic than useful. The original reason was to fix the logic for determining when not to print the PDPTE pointers. However, mutating the efer variable (particularly LME and LMA) before printing it interferes with diagnosing vmentry failures. Instead of modifying efer, change the PDPTE conditional to use VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich Acked-by: Kevin Tian Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross --- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c | 7 ++----- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c index 70c2fb7482..b783ff0d45 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c @@ -1788,10 +1788,7 @@ void vmcs_dump_vcpu(struct vcpu *v) vmentry_ctl = vmr32(VM_ENTRY_CONTROLS), vmexit_ctl = vmr32(VM_EXIT_CONTROLS); cr4 = vmr(GUEST_CR4); - - /* EFER.LMA is read as zero, and is loaded from vmentry_ctl on entry. */ - BUILD_BUG_ON(VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE << 1 != EFER_LMA); - efer = vmr(GUEST_EFER) | ((vmentry_ctl & VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE) << 1); + efer = vmr(GUEST_EFER); printk("*** Guest State ***\n"); printk("CR0: actual=0x%016lx, shadow=0x%016lx, gh_mask=%016lx\n", @@ -1801,7 +1798,7 @@ void vmcs_dump_vcpu(struct vcpu *v) printk("CR3 = 0x%016lx\n", vmr(GUEST_CR3)); if ( (v->arch.hvm_vmx.secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT) && - (cr4 & X86_CR4_PAE) && !(efer & EFER_LMA) ) + (cr4 & X86_CR4_PAE) && !(vmentry_ctl & VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE) ) { printk("PDPTE0 = 0x%016lx PDPTE1 = 0x%016lx\n", vmr(GUEST_PDPTE(0)), vmr(GUEST_PDPTE(1))); -- 2.30.2