ask-password: prevent buffer overflow when reading from keyring
When we read from keyring, a temporary buffer is allocated in order to
determine the size needed for the entire data. However, when zeroing that area,
we use the data size returned by the read instead of the lesser size allocate
for the buffer.
That will cause memory corruption that causes systemd-cryptsetup to crash
either when a single large password is used or when multiple passwords have
already been pushed to the keyring.
random-util: eat up bad RDRAND values seen on AMD CPUs
An ugly, ugly work-around for #11810. And no, we shouldn't have to do
this. This is something for AMD, the firmware or the kernel to
fix/work-around, not us. But nonetheless, this should do it for now.
socket-util: make sure flush_accept() doesn't hang on unexpected EOPNOTSUPP
So apparently there are two reasons why accept() can return EOPNOTSUPP:
because the socket is not a listening stream socket (or similar), or
because the incoming TCP connection for some reason wasn't acceptable to
the host. THe latter should be a transient error, as suggested on
accept(2). The former however should be considered fatal for
flush_accept(). Let's fix this by explicitly checking whether the socket
is a listening socket beforehand.
projects / systemd.git / log