From: Lee, Chun-Yi <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 10:38:02 +0000 (+0800)
Subject: [PATCH 3/4] MODSIGN: checking the blacklisted hash before loading a kernel module
X-Git-Tag: archive/raspbian/6.1.140-1+rpi1^2~61
X-Git-Url: https://dgit.raspbian.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=d970cdd7da0de1cb9c0f7f41e301327e722cbb6c;p=linux.git

[PATCH 3/4] MODSIGN: checking the blacklisted hash before loading a kernel module

Origin: https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/933175/

This patch adds the logic for checking the kernel module's hash
base on blacklist. The hash must be generated by sha256 and enrolled
to dbx/mokx.

For example:
	sha256sum sample.ko
	mokutil --mokx --import-hash $HASH_RESULT

Whether the signature on ko file is stripped or not, the hash can be
compared by kernel.

Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Signed-off-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
[Rebased by Luca Boccassi]
[bwh: Forward-ported to 5.19:
 - The type parameter to is_hash_blacklisted() is now an enumeration
   rather than a string
 - Adjust filename, context]

Gbp-Pq: Topic features/all/db-mok-keyring
Gbp-Pq: Name 0003-MODSIGN-checking-the-blacklisted-hash-before-loading-a-kernel-module.patch
---

diff --git a/kernel/module/signing.c b/kernel/module/signing.c
index a2ff4242e62..494aa421916 100644
--- a/kernel/module/signing.c
+++ b/kernel/module/signing.c
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
 #include <linux/verification.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <crypto/public_key.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
 #include <uapi/linux/module.h>
 #include "internal.h"
 
@@ -37,13 +39,60 @@ void set_module_sig_enforced(void)
 	sig_enforce = true;
 }
 
+static int mod_is_hash_blacklisted(const void *mod, size_t verifylen)
+{
+	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+	struct shash_desc *desc;
+	size_t digest_size, desc_size;
+	u8 *digest;
+	int ret;
+
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(tfm);
+		goto error_return;
+	}
+
+	desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
+	digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+	digest = kzalloc(digest_size + desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!digest) {
+		pr_err("digest memory buffer allocate fail\n");
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto error_digest;
+	}
+	desc = (void *)digest + digest_size;
+	desc->tfm = tfm;
+	ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error_shash;
+
+	ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, mod, verifylen, digest);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error_shash;
+
+	pr_debug("%ld digest: %*phN\n", verifylen, (int) digest_size, digest);
+
+	ret = is_hash_blacklisted(digest, digest_size, BLACKLIST_HASH_BINARY);
+	if (ret == -EKEYREJECTED)
+		pr_err("Module hash %*phN is blacklisted\n",
+		       (int) digest_size, digest);
+
+error_shash:
+	kfree(digest);
+error_digest:
+	crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+error_return:
+	return ret;
+}
+
 /*
  * Verify the signature on a module.
  */
 int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info)
 {
 	struct module_signature ms;
-	size_t sig_len, modlen = info->len;
+	size_t sig_len, modlen = info->len, wholelen;
 	int ret;
 
 	pr_devel("==>%s(,%zu)\n", __func__, modlen);
@@ -51,6 +100,7 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info)
 	if (modlen <= sizeof(ms))
 		return -EBADMSG;
 
+	wholelen = modlen + sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
 	memcpy(&ms, mod + (modlen - sizeof(ms)), sizeof(ms));
 
 	ret = mod_check_sig(&ms, modlen, "module");
@@ -61,10 +111,17 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info)
 	modlen -= sig_len + sizeof(ms);
 	info->len = modlen;
 
-	return verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len,
+	ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len,
 				      VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
 				      VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
 				      NULL, NULL);
+	pr_devel("verify_pkcs7_signature() = %d\n", ret);
+
+	/* checking hash of module is in blacklist */
+	if (!ret)
+		ret = mod_is_hash_blacklisted(mod, wholelen);
+
+	return ret;
 }
 
 int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)