From: Jan Beulich Date: Thu, 8 May 2014 11:57:12 +0000 (+0200) Subject: domctl: tighten XEN_DOMCTL_*_permission X-Git-Tag: archive/raspbian/4.8.0-1+rpi1~1^2~5044 X-Git-Url: https://dgit.raspbian.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=b27b47b0b38b336226ba390f3cf74d66c21905ed;p=xen.git domctl: tighten XEN_DOMCTL_*_permission With proper permission (and, for the I/O port case, wrap-around) checks added (note that for the I/O port case a count of zero is now being disallowed, in line with I/O memory handling): XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission: XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission: Of both IRQs and I/O ports there is only a reasonably small amount, so there's no excess resource consumption involved here. Additionally they both have a specialized XSM hook associated. XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission: While this also has a specialized XSM hook associated (just like XEN_DOMCTL_{irq,ioport}_permission), it's not clear whether it's reasonable to expect XSM to restrict the number of ranges associated with a domain via this hook (which is the main resource consumption item here). Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan --- diff --git a/docs/misc/xsm-flask.txt b/docs/misc/xsm-flask.txt index d06983c67f..31b9d27e4f 100644 --- a/docs/misc/xsm-flask.txt +++ b/docs/misc/xsm-flask.txt @@ -72,9 +72,7 @@ __HYPERVISOR_domctl (xen/include/public/domctl.h) * XEN_DOMCTL_getvcpucontext * XEN_DOMCTL_max_vcpus * XEN_DOMCTL_scheduler_op - * XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission * XEN_DOMCTL_iomem_permission - * XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission * XEN_DOMCTL_gethvmcontext * XEN_DOMCTL_sethvmcontext * XEN_DOMCTL_set_address_size diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c index d792e8767e..fbdc8e6107 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c @@ -46,6 +46,8 @@ static int gdbsx_guest_mem_io( return (iop->remain ? -EFAULT : 0); } +#define MAX_IOPORTS 0x10000 + long arch_do_domctl( struct xen_domctl *domctl, struct domain *d, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_domctl_t) u_domctl) @@ -72,13 +74,11 @@ long arch_do_domctl( unsigned int np = domctl->u.ioport_permission.nr_ports; int allow = domctl->u.ioport_permission.allow_access; - ret = -EINVAL; - if ( (fp + np) > 65536 ) - break; - - if ( np == 0 ) - ret = 0; - else if ( xsm_ioport_permission(XSM_HOOK, d, fp, fp + np - 1, allow) ) + if ( (fp + np) <= fp || (fp + np) > MAX_IOPORTS ) + ret = -EINVAL; + else if ( !ioports_access_permitted(current->domain, + fp, fp + np - 1) || + xsm_ioport_permission(XSM_HOOK, d, fp, fp + np - 1, allow) ) ret = -EPERM; else if ( allow ) ret = ioports_permit_access(d, fp, fp + np - 1); @@ -719,7 +719,6 @@ long arch_do_domctl( case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping: { -#define MAX_IOPORTS 0x10000 struct hvm_iommu *hd; unsigned int fgp = domctl->u.ioport_mapping.first_gport; unsigned int fmp = domctl->u.ioport_mapping.first_mport; diff --git a/xen/common/domctl.c b/xen/common/domctl.c index af3614b54f..2ba5daa65f 100644 --- a/xen/common/domctl.c +++ b/xen/common/domctl.c @@ -790,7 +790,8 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_domctl_t) u_domctl) if ( pirq >= d->nr_pirqs ) ret = -EINVAL; - else if ( xsm_irq_permission(XSM_HOOK, d, pirq, allow) ) + else if ( !pirq_access_permitted(current->domain, pirq) || + xsm_irq_permission(XSM_HOOK, d, pirq, allow) ) ret = -EPERM; else if ( allow ) ret = pirq_permit_access(d, pirq); @@ -809,7 +810,9 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_domctl_t) u_domctl) if ( (mfn + nr_mfns - 1) < mfn ) /* wrap? */ break; - if ( xsm_iomem_permission(XSM_HOOK, d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1, allow) ) + if ( !iomem_access_permitted(current->domain, + mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1) || + xsm_iomem_permission(XSM_HOOK, d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1, allow) ) ret = -EPERM; else if ( allow ) ret = iomem_permit_access(d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1);