From: Go Compiler Team Date: Sat, 13 Mar 2021 14:48:57 +0000 (+0000) Subject: CVE-2019-16276 X-Git-Tag: archive/raspbian/1.7.4-2+rpi1+deb9u3^2~3 X-Git-Url: https://dgit.raspbian.org/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=a29cb173cffe6341e8bfb79f47c41db2364cab48;p=golang-1.7.git CVE-2019-16276 Origin: https://github.com/golang/go/commit/6e6f4aaf70c8b1cc81e65a26332aa9409de03ad8 Reviewed-by: Sylvain Beucler Last-Update: 2021-03-12 From 6e6f4aaf70c8b1cc81e65a26332aa9409de03ad8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Filippo Valsorda Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2019 12:37:36 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] [release-branch.go1.12-security] net/textproto: don't normalize headers with spaces before the colon RFC 7230 is clear about headers with a space before the colon, like X-Answer : 42 being invalid, but we've been accepting and normalizing them for compatibility purposes since CL 5690059 in 2012. On the client side, this is harmless and indeed most browsers behave the same to this day. On the server side, this becomes a security issue when the behavior doesn't match that of a reverse proxy sitting in front of the server. For example, if a WAF accepts them without normalizing them, it might be possible to bypass its filters, because the Go server would interpret the header differently. Worse, if the reverse proxy coalesces requests onto a single HTTP/1.1 connection to a Go server, the understanding of the request boundaries can get out of sync between them, allowing an attacker to tack an arbitrary method and path onto a request by other clients, including authentication headers unknown to the attacker. This was recently presented at multiple security conferences: https://portswigger.net/blog/http-desync-attacks-request-smuggling-reborn net/http servers already reject header keys with invalid characters. Simply stop normalizing extra spaces in net/textproto, let it return them unchanged like it does for other invalid headers, and let net/http enforce RFC 7230, which is HTTP specific. This loses us normalization on the client side, but there's no right answer on the client side anyway, and hiding the issue sounds worse than letting the application decide. Fixes CVE-2019-16276 Change-Id: I6d272de827e0870da85d93df770d6a0e161bbcf1 Reviewed-on: https://team-review.git.corp.google.com/c/golang/go-private/+/549719 Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick (cherry picked from commit 1280b868e82bf173ea3e988be3092d160ee66082) Reviewed-on: https://team-review.git.corp.google.com/c/golang/go-private/+/558776 Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov Gbp-Pq: Name CVE-2019-16276.patch --- diff --git a/src/net/http/serve_test.go b/src/net/http/serve_test.go index 13e5f28..de053dc 100644 --- a/src/net/http/serve_test.go +++ b/src/net/http/serve_test.go @@ -4101,6 +4101,11 @@ func TestServerValidatesHeaders(t *testing.T) { {"foo\xffbar: foo\r\n", 400}, // binary in header {"foo\x00bar: foo\r\n", 400}, // binary in header + // Spaces between the header key and colon are not allowed. + // See RFC 7230, Section 3.2.4. + {"Foo : bar\r\n", 400}, + {"Foo\t: bar\r\n", 400}, + {"foo: foo foo\r\n", 200}, // LWS space is okay {"foo: foo\tfoo\r\n", 200}, // LWS tab is okay {"foo: foo\x00foo\r\n", 400}, // CTL 0x00 in value is bad diff --git a/src/net/http/transport_test.go b/src/net/http/transport_test.go index 298682d..260f25c 100644 --- a/src/net/http/transport_test.go +++ b/src/net/http/transport_test.go @@ -3687,3 +3687,30 @@ var rgz = []byte{ 0x00, 0x00, 0x3d, 0xb1, 0x20, 0x85, 0xfa, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, } + +func TestInvalidHeaderResponse(t *testing.T) { + setParallel(t) + defer afterTest(t) + cst := newClientServerTest(t, h1Mode, HandlerFunc(func(w ResponseWriter, r *Request) { + conn, buf, _ := w.(Hijacker).Hijack() + buf.Write([]byte("HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n" + + "Date: Wed, 30 Aug 2017 19:09:27 GMT\r\n" + + "Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8\r\n" + + "Content-Length: 0\r\n" + + "Foo : bar\r\n\r\n")) + buf.Flush() + conn.Close() + })) + defer cst.close() + res, err := cst.c.Get(cst.ts.URL) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + defer res.Body.Close() + if v := res.Header.Get("Foo"); v != "" { + t.Errorf(`unexpected "Foo" header: %q`, v) + } + if v := res.Header.Get("Foo "); v != "bar" { + t.Errorf(`bad "Foo " header value: %q, want %q`, v, "bar") + } +} diff --git a/src/net/textproto/reader.go b/src/net/textproto/reader.go index e07d1d6..701999b 100644 --- a/src/net/textproto/reader.go +++ b/src/net/textproto/reader.go @@ -482,18 +482,12 @@ func (r *Reader) ReadMIMEHeader() (MIMEHeader, error) { return m, err } - // Key ends at first colon; should not have spaces but - // they appear in the wild, violating specs, so we - // remove them if present. + // Key ends at first colon. i := bytes.IndexByte(kv, ':') if i < 0 { return m, ProtocolError("malformed MIME header line: " + string(kv)) } - endKey := i - for endKey > 0 && kv[endKey-1] == ' ' { - endKey-- - } - key := canonicalMIMEHeaderKey(kv[:endKey]) + key := canonicalMIMEHeaderKey(kv[:i]) // As per RFC 7230 field-name is a token, tokens consist of one or more chars. // We could return a ProtocolError here, but better to be liberal in what we diff --git a/src/net/textproto/reader_test.go b/src/net/textproto/reader_test.go index 6cd98ed..01459e5 100644 --- a/src/net/textproto/reader_test.go +++ b/src/net/textproto/reader_test.go @@ -188,11 +188,10 @@ func TestLargeReadMIMEHeader(t *testing.T) { } } -// Test that we read slightly-bogus MIME headers seen in the wild, -// with spaces before colons, and spaces in keys. +// TestReadMIMEHeaderNonCompliant checks that we don't normalize headers +// with spaces before colons, and accept spaces in keys. func TestReadMIMEHeaderNonCompliant(t *testing.T) { - // Invalid HTTP response header as sent by an Axis security - // camera: (this is handled by IE, Firefox, Chrome, curl, etc.) + // These invalid headers will be rejected by net/http according to RFC 7230. r := reader("Foo: bar\r\n" + "Content-Language: en\r\n" + "SID : 0\r\n" + @@ -202,9 +201,9 @@ func TestReadMIMEHeaderNonCompliant(t *testing.T) { want := MIMEHeader{ "Foo": {"bar"}, "Content-Language": {"en"}, - "Sid": {"0"}, - "Audio Mode": {"None"}, - "Privilege": {"127"}, + "SID ": {"0"}, + "Audio Mode ": {"None"}, + "Privilege ": {"127"}, } if !reflect.DeepEqual(m, want) || err != nil { t.Fatalf("ReadMIMEHeader =\n%v, %v; want:\n%v", m, err, want)