If panic is called before init_idle_domain on a tboot-launched system,
then Xen recursively faults in write_ptbase as seen below.
(XEN) [<
ffff82d080286690>] write_ptbase+0/0x10
(XEN) [<
ffff82d0802c4c3b>] tboot_shutdown+0x6b/0x260
(XEN) [<
ffff82d08029ddac>] machine_restart+0xac/0x2d0
(XEN) [<
ffff82d080286690>] write_ptbase+0/0x10
(XEN) [<
ffff82d0802446c1>] panic+0x111/0x120
(XEN) [<
ffff82d0802a51c1>] do_general_protection+0x171/0x1f0
(XEN) [<
ffff82d080287a82>] mm.c#virt_to_xen_l2e+0x12/0x1c0
(XEN) [<
ffff82d080354720>] x86_64/entry.S#handle_exception_saved+0x66/0xa4
(XEN) [<
ffff82d080286690>] write_ptbase+0/0x10
(XEN) [<
ffff82d0802c4c3b>] tboot_shutdown+0x6b/0x260
(XEN) [<
ffff82d08029ddac>] machine_restart+0xac/0x2d0
(XEN) [<
ffff82d0802446c1>] panic+0x111/0x120
(XEN) [<
ffff82d0803c11a0>] setup.c#bootstrap_map+0/0x11a
(XEN) [<
ffff82d0803b82a0>] flask_op.c#parse_flask_param+0/0xb0
(XEN) [<
ffff82d0803c11a0>] setup.c#bootstrap_map+0/0x11a
(XEN) [<
ffff82d0803b6f6c>] xsm_multiboot_init+0x7c/0xb0
(XEN) [<
ffff82d0803c34bb>] __start_xen+0x1d2b/0x2da0
(XEN) [<
ffff82d0802000f3>] __high_start+0x53/0x60
idle_vcpu[0] is still poisoned with INVALID_VCPU, so write_ptbase faults
dereferencing the pointer. This fault calls panic and recurses through
the same code path.
If tboot_shutdown is called while idle_vcpu[0] == INVALID_VCPU, then we
are still operating with the initial page tables. Therefore changing
page tables with write_ptbase is unnecessary.
An easy way to reproduce this is to use tboot to launch an XSM-enabled
Xen without an XSM policy.
Signed-off-by: Jason Andryuk <jandryuk@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
tboot_gen_xenheap_integrity(g_tboot_shared->s3_key, &xenheap_mac);
}
- write_ptbase(idle_vcpu[0]);
+ /*
+ * During early boot, we can be called by panic before idle_vcpu[0] is
+ * setup, but in that case we don't need to change page tables.
+ */
+ if ( idle_vcpu[0] != INVALID_VCPU )
+ write_ptbase(idle_vcpu[0]);
((void(*)(void))(unsigned long)g_tboot_shared->shutdown_entry)();