security,perf: Allow further restriction of perf_event_open
authorBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Mon, 11 Jan 2016 15:23:55 +0000 (15:23 +0000)
committerSalvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
Fri, 25 Apr 2025 19:51:43 +0000 (21:51 +0200)
Forwarded: https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/1/11/587

When kernel.perf_event_open is set to 3 (or greater), disallow all
access to performance events by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
Add a Kconfig symbol CONFIG_SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT that
makes this value the default.

This is based on a similar feature in grsecurity
(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PERF_HARDEN).  This version doesn't include making
the variable read-only.  It also allows enabling further restriction
at run-time regardless of whether the default is changed.

Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Gbp-Pq: Topic features/all
Gbp-Pq: Name security-perf-allow-further-restriction-of-perf_event_open.patch

include/linux/perf_event.h
kernel/events/core.c
security/Kconfig

index 27b694552d58bd5d0d05f2fbcfd1cc1a383327a5..596f30632ba037b545eadec30bb3414990cf9f5e 100644 (file)
@@ -1405,6 +1405,11 @@ int perf_cpu_time_max_percent_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 int perf_event_max_stack_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
                void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
 
+static inline bool perf_paranoid_any(void)
+{
+       return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 2;
+}
+
 /* Access to perf_event_open(2) syscall. */
 #define PERF_SECURITY_OPEN             0
 
index 8fc2bc5646ee20b153c69b981d8e26dc582c45a3..66ab35794fb1a5ab6223ff135f81dc7b229b5704 100644 (file)
@@ -415,8 +415,13 @@ static struct kmem_cache *perf_event_cache;
  *   0 - disallow raw tracepoint access for unpriv
  *   1 - disallow cpu events for unpriv
  *   2 - disallow kernel profiling for unpriv
+ *   3 - disallow all unpriv perf event use
  */
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT
+int sysctl_perf_event_paranoid __read_mostly = 3;
+#else
 int sysctl_perf_event_paranoid __read_mostly = 2;
+#endif
 
 /* Minimum for 512 kiB + 1 user control page */
 int sysctl_perf_event_mlock __read_mostly = 512 + (PAGE_SIZE / 1024); /* 'free' kiB per user */
@@ -12355,6 +12360,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
        if (err)
                return err;
 
+       if (perf_paranoid_any() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+               return -EACCES;
+
        /* Do we allow access to perf_event_open(2) ? */
        err = security_perf_event_open(&attr, PERF_SECURITY_OPEN);
        if (err)
index 8cd544714ed23312ca8684ced06d1b9631e4571a..2ce2c22d6c91a3618825b27cf139df71586990c1 100644 (file)
@@ -51,6 +51,15 @@ config PROC_MEM_NO_FORCE
 
 endchoice
 
+config SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT
+       bool "Restrict unprivileged use of performance events"
+       depends on PERF_EVENTS
+       help
+         If you say Y here, the kernel.perf_event_paranoid sysctl
+         will be set to 3 by default, and no unprivileged use of the
+         perf_event_open syscall will be permitted unless it is
+         changed.
+
 config SECURITY
        bool "Enable different security models"
        depends on SYSFS