allow hardware domain != dom0

This adds a hypervisor command line option "hardware_dom=" which takes a
domain ID.  When the domain with this ID is created, it will be used
as the hardware domain.

This is intended to be used when domain 0 is a dedicated stub domain for
domain building, allowing the hardware domain to be de-privileged and
act only as a driver domain.

Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>

diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
index 87de2dcdb23cb25168563606ddb5edd67aa3c360..e8d23b4984994f367269426a513432a74d33290f 100644 (file)
--- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
+++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
@@ -590,6 +590,16 @@ Paging (HAP).
 Flag to enable 2 MB host page table support for Hardware Assisted
 Paging (HAP).
 
+### hardware\_dom
+> `= <domid>`
+
+> Default: `0`
+
+Enable late hardware domain creation using the specified domain ID.  This is
+intended to be used when domain 0 is a stub domain which builds a disaggregated
+system including a hardware domain with the specified domain ID.  This option is
+supported only when compiled with XSM\_ENABLE=y on x86.
+
 ### hpetbroadcast
 > `= <boolean>`
 

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c
index 9b462fe498d890f1114775c7a31fc50148e68315..1eccead6774f10dd63e3bf381f9ddbb859485a04 100644 (file)
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c
@@ -1179,7 +1179,9 @@ int __init construct_dom0(
         printk(" Xen warning: dom0 kernel broken ELF: %s\n",
                elf_check_broken(&elf));
 
-    iommu_hwdom_init(hardware_domain);
+    if ( d->domain_id == hardware_domid )
+        iommu_hwdom_init(d);
+
     return 0;
 
 out:

diff --git a/xen/common/domain.c b/xen/common/domain.c
index 3c05711d5f6da07935e6f0944f78795884a7c0f6..4291e299ece99d13acef15d731aa1ac4e818c66d 100644 (file)
--- a/xen/common/domain.c
+++ b/xen/common/domain.c
@@ -61,6 +61,11 @@ struct domain *domain_list;
 
 struct domain *hardware_domain __read_mostly;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_LATE_HWDOM
+domid_t hardware_domid __read_mostly;
+integer_param("hardware_dom", hardware_domid);
+#endif
+
 struct vcpu *idle_vcpu[NR_CPUS] __read_mostly;
 
 vcpu_info_t dummy_vcpu_info;
@@ -178,6 +183,51 @@ struct vcpu *alloc_vcpu(
     return v;
 }
 
+static int late_hwdom_init(struct domain *d)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_LATE_HWDOM
+    struct domain *dom0;
+    int rv;
+
+    if ( d != hardware_domain || d->domain_id == 0 )
+        return 0;
+
+    rv = xsm_init_hardware_domain(XSM_HOOK, d);
+    if ( rv )
+        return rv;
+
+    printk("Initialising hardware domain %d\n", hardware_domid);
+
+    dom0 = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(0);
+    ASSERT(dom0 != NULL);
+    /*
+     * Hardware resource ranges for domain 0 have been set up from
+     * various sources intended to restrict the hardware domain's
+     * access.  Apply these ranges to the actual hardware domain.
+     *
+     * Because the lists are being swapped, a side effect of this
+     * operation is that Domain 0's rangesets are cleared.  Since
+     * domain 0 should not be accessing the hardware when it constructs
+     * a hardware domain, this should not be a problem.  Both lists
+     * may be modified after this hypercall returns if a more complex
+     * device model is desired.
+     */
+    rangeset_swap(d->irq_caps, dom0->irq_caps);
+    rangeset_swap(d->iomem_caps, dom0->iomem_caps);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86
+    rangeset_swap(d->arch.ioport_caps, dom0->arch.ioport_caps);
+#endif
+
+    rcu_unlock_domain(dom0);
+
+    iommu_hwdom_init(d);
+
+    return rv;
+#else
+    return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
 static unsigned int __read_mostly extra_dom0_irqs = 256;
 static unsigned int __read_mostly extra_domU_irqs = 32;
 static void __init parse_extra_guest_irqs(const char *s)
@@ -192,7 +242,7 @@ custom_param("extra_guest_irqs", parse_extra_guest_irqs);
 struct domain *domain_create(
     domid_t domid, unsigned int domcr_flags, uint32_t ssidref)
 {
-    struct domain *d, **pd;
+    struct domain *d, **pd, *old_hwdom = NULL;
     enum { INIT_xsm = 1u<<0, INIT_watchdog = 1u<<1, INIT_rangeset = 1u<<2,
            INIT_evtchn = 1u<<3, INIT_gnttab = 1u<<4, INIT_arch = 1u<<5 };
     int err, init_status = 0;
@@ -237,10 +287,13 @@ struct domain *domain_create(
     else if ( domcr_flags & DOMCRF_pvh )
         d->guest_type = guest_type_pvh;
 
-    if ( domid == 0 )
+    if ( domid == 0 || domid == hardware_domid )
     {
+        if ( hardware_domid < 0 || hardware_domid >= DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED )
+            panic("The value of hardware_dom must be a valid domain ID");
         d->is_pinned = opt_dom0_vcpus_pin;
         d->disable_migrate = 1;
+        old_hwdom = hardware_domain;
         hardware_domain = d;
     }
 
@@ -302,6 +355,9 @@ struct domain *domain_create(
     if ( (err = sched_init_domain(d)) != 0 )
         goto fail;
 
+    if ( (err = late_hwdom_init(d)) != 0 )
+        goto fail;
+
     if ( !is_idle_domain(d) )
     {
         spin_lock(&domlist_update_lock);
@@ -321,7 +377,7 @@ struct domain *domain_create(
  fail:
     d->is_dying = DOMDYING_dead;
     if ( hardware_domain == d )
-        hardware_domain = NULL;
+        hardware_domain = old_hwdom;
     atomic_set(&d->refcnt, DOMAIN_DESTROYED);
     xfree(d->mem_event);
     xfree(d->pbuf);

diff --git a/xen/common/rangeset.c b/xen/common/rangeset.c
index f09c0c44530eb878de51c03e20187b42cfd21208..2b986fbaa194d5df0f0bf5923ec33f0ea7f04a89 100644 (file)
--- a/xen/common/rangeset.c
+++ b/xen/common/rangeset.c
@@ -380,6 +380,29 @@ void rangeset_domain_destroy(
     }
 }
 
+void rangeset_swap(struct rangeset *a, struct rangeset *b)
+{
+    LIST_HEAD(tmp);
+
+    if ( a < b )
+    {
+        spin_lock(&a->lock);
+        spin_lock(&b->lock);
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        spin_lock(&b->lock);
+        spin_lock(&a->lock);
+    }
+
+    list_splice_init(&a->range_list, &tmp);
+    list_splice_init(&b->range_list, &a->range_list);
+    list_splice(&tmp, &b->range_list);
+
+    spin_unlock(&a->lock);
+    spin_unlock(&b->lock);
+}
+
 /*****************************
  * Pretty-printing functions
  */

diff --git a/xen/include/xen/rangeset.h b/xen/include/xen/rangeset.h
index 1e16a6b31927e517d03a4945b49f5175d34cfd75..2c122c1b96d478d1fdea05dc20a0428e5536051f 100644 (file)
--- a/xen/include/xen/rangeset.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/rangeset.h
@@ -67,6 +67,9 @@ int __must_check rangeset_remove_singleton(
 int __must_check rangeset_contains_singleton(
     struct rangeset *r, unsigned long s);
 
+/* swap contents */
+void rangeset_swap(struct rangeset *a, struct rangeset *b);
+
 /* Rangeset pretty printing. */
 void rangeset_printk(
     struct rangeset *r);

diff --git a/xen/include/xen/sched.h b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
index 734f7a9745e0ea807ebd50d4916bba9cd25bef1a..44851aee963214e618aae3da9ae71e1c8e8665a3 100644 (file)
--- a/xen/include/xen/sched.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
@@ -46,6 +46,12 @@ DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(vcpu_runstate_info_compat_t);
 /* A global pointer to the hardware domain (usually DOM0). */
 extern struct domain *hardware_domain;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_LATE_HWDOM
+extern domid_t hardware_domid;
+#else
+#define hardware_domid 0
+#endif
+
 #ifndef CONFIG_COMPAT
 #define BITS_PER_EVTCHN_WORD(d) BITS_PER_XEN_ULONG
 #else

diff --git a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
index c3be99aa15d35b8f633e5bbd2df3135f11342e0f..5de4ad4ed3aa085dae5e7d6bba7eccdf7bd8bdb9 100644 (file)
--- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
+++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
@@ -299,6 +299,12 @@ static XSM_INLINE char *xsm_show_security_evtchn(struct domain *d, const struct
     return NULL;
 }
 
+static XSM_INLINE int xsm_init_hardware_domain(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d)
+{
+    XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
+    return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
+}
+
 static XSM_INLINE int xsm_get_pod_target(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d)
 {
     XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_PRIV);

diff --git a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
index 330d5d2d4a72c4559a556fd9476b3eadba63d719..0c85ca6c17d82f6238d1e32f9c0f46c1e3d667d4 100644 (file)
--- a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
+++ b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ struct xsm_operations {
     int (*alloc_security_evtchn) (struct evtchn *chn);
     void (*free_security_evtchn) (struct evtchn *chn);
     char *(*show_security_evtchn) (struct domain *d, const struct evtchn *chn);
+    int (*init_hardware_domain) (struct domain *d);
 
     int (*get_pod_target) (struct domain *d);
     int (*set_pod_target) (struct domain *d);
@@ -309,6 +310,11 @@ static inline char *xsm_show_security_evtchn (struct domain *d, const struct evt
     return xsm_ops->show_security_evtchn(d, chn);
 }
 
+static inline int xsm_init_hardware_domain (xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d)
+{
+    return xsm_ops->init_hardware_domain(d);
+}
+
 static inline int xsm_get_pod_target (xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d)
 {
     return xsm_ops->get_pod_target(d);

diff --git a/xen/xsm/dummy.c b/xen/xsm/dummy.c
index 792a7fa0fa512627fe5dd77b00bd94e11329f100..80015b17602cb81c258852b3c289f15aa3d025cd 100644 (file)
--- a/xen/xsm/dummy.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/dummy.c
@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@ void xsm_fixup_ops (struct xsm_operations *ops)
     set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, alloc_security_evtchn);
     set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, free_security_evtchn);
     set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, show_security_evtchn);
+    set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, init_hardware_domain);
+
     set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, get_pod_target);
     set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, set_pod_target);
 

diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
index 9a6b1998909b14b2a4fb709b07ebf25bc5006867..3eb6c1e6fb76bd053cf2b5077dd79c2dbc081613 100644 (file)
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
@@ -327,6 +327,11 @@ static char *flask_show_security_evtchn(struct domain *d, const struct evtchn *c
     return ctx;
 }
 
+static int flask_init_hardware_domain(struct domain *d)
+{
+    return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_DOMAIN2, DOMAIN2__CREATE_HARDWARE_DOMAIN);
+}
+
 static int flask_grant_mapref(struct domain *d1, struct domain *d2, 
                               uint32_t flags)
 {
@@ -1498,6 +1503,7 @@ static struct xsm_operations flask_ops = {
     .alloc_security_evtchn = flask_alloc_security_evtchn,
     .free_security_evtchn = flask_free_security_evtchn,
     .show_security_evtchn = flask_show_security_evtchn,
+    .init_hardware_domain = flask_init_hardware_domain,
 
     .get_pod_target = flask_get_pod_target,
     .set_pod_target = flask_set_pod_target,

diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors b/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors
index a0ed13d5ae29a5789da6ed02aa16c03692a63194..32371a9371efb706a9516ae197693b4e0fb18366 100644 (file)
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors
@@ -198,6 +198,8 @@ class domain2
     set_max_evtchn
 # XEN_DOMCTL_cacheflush
     cacheflush
+# Creation of the hardware domain when it is not dom0
+    create_hardware_domain
 }
 
 # Similar to class domain, but primarily contains domctls related to HVM domains