This patch mitigates the vulnerability identified via CVE-2019-14196.
The previous patch was bypassed/ineffective, and now the vulnerability
is identified via CVE-2022-30767. The patch removes the sanity check
introduced to mitigate CVE-2019-14196 since it's ineffective.
filefh3_length is changed to unsigned type integer, preventing negative
numbers from being used during comparison with positive values during
size sanity checks.
Signed-off-by: Andrea zi0Black Cappa <zi0Black@protonmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Daniel Leidert <dleidert@debian.org>
Origin: https://source.denx.de/u-boot/u-boot/-/commit/
bdbf7a05e26f3c5fd437c99e2755ffde186ddc80
Bug: https://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/2022-May/483952.htmll
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/
1014471
Bug-Debian-Security: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2022-30767
Bug-Freexian-Security: https://deb.freexian.com/extended-lts/tracker/CVE-2022-30767
Gbp-Pq: Name CVE-2022-30767.patch
static char dirfh[NFS_FHSIZE]; /* NFSv2 / NFSv3 file handle of directory */
static char filefh[NFS3_FHSIZE]; /* NFSv2 / NFSv3 file handle */
-static int filefh3_length; /* (variable) length of filefh when NFSv3 */
+static unsigned int filefh3_length; /* (variable) length of filefh when NFSv3 */
static enum net_loop_state nfs_download_state;
static struct in_addr nfs_server_ip;
filefh3_length = ntohl(rpc_pkt.u.reply.data[1]);
if (filefh3_length > NFS3_FHSIZE)
filefh3_length = NFS3_FHSIZE;
- if (((uchar *)&(rpc_pkt.u.reply.data[0]) - (uchar *)(&rpc_pkt) + filefh3_length) > len)
- return -NFS_RPC_DROP;
memcpy(filefh, rpc_pkt.u.reply.data + 2, filefh3_length);
}