Bluetooth: hidp: fix buffer overflow

Struct ca is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "name"
field is NULL terminated, which allows local users to obtain potentially
sensitive information from kernel stack memory, via a HIDPCONNADD command.

This vulnerability is similar to CVE-2011-1079.

Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <YangX92@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Gbp-Pq: Topic bugfix/all
Gbp-Pq: Name Bluetooth-hidp-fix-buffer-overflow.patch

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hidp/sock.c b/net/bluetooth/hidp/sock.c
index 1eaac01f85de7f2fb78d74587dd9a997c9429a0e..7f36fa73ffee13ec34a2ed2b491dc6025b505999 100644 (file)
--- a/net/bluetooth/hidp/sock.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hidp/sock.c
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ static int hidp_sock_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long
                        sockfd_put(csock);
                        return err;
                }
+               ca.name[sizeof(ca.name)-1] = 0;
 
                err = hidp_connection_add(&ca, csock, isock);
                if (!err && copy_to_user(argp, &ca, sizeof(ca)))