x86/speculation/mds: Print SMT vulnerable on MSBDS with mitigations off
authorKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Fri, 12 Apr 2019 21:50:58 +0000 (17:50 -0400)
committerBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Wed, 19 Jun 2019 22:16:58 +0000 (23:16 +0100)
commitecbef6767d02ab039eeb6de2e29a2f0a0fb876d8
treebf457afd2c8028434a7196978e1f1f2ba1a3cd50
parent3db1a32ecaca1246323e2b8e50b1341083df2135
x86/speculation/mds: Print SMT vulnerable on MSBDS with mitigations off

commit e2c3c94788b08891dcf3dbe608f9880523ecd71b upstream

This code is only for CPUs which are affected by MSBDS, but are *not*
affected by the other two MDS issues.

For such CPUs, enabling the mds_idle_clear mitigation is enough to
mitigate SMT.

However if user boots with 'mds=off' and still has SMT enabled, we should
not report that SMT is mitigated:

$cat /sys//devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
Vulnerable; SMT mitigated

But rather:
Vulnerable; SMT vulnerable

Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190412215118.294906495@localhost.localdomain
Gbp-Pq: Topic bugfix/all/spec
Gbp-Pq: Name 0022-x86-speculation-mds-Print-SMT-vulnerable-on-MSBDS-wi.patch
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c