x86/spec-ctrl: Use IST RSB protection for !SVM systems
authorAndrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Tue, 2 Aug 2022 13:30:30 +0000 (14:30 +0100)
committerAndrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Fri, 5 Aug 2022 11:16:24 +0000 (12:16 +0100)
commite570e8d520ab542d8d35666b95cb3a0125b7b110
tree6b7738845efa3cb85636e581aa06ac5c78d84ad3
parentcc7410683db0a98758d03401b628ba8652c20c18
x86/spec-ctrl: Use IST RSB protection for !SVM systems

There is a corner case where a VT-x guest which manages to reliably trigger
non-fatal #MC's could evade the rogue RSB speculation protections that were
supposed to be in place.

This is a lack of defence in depth; Xen does not architecturally execute more
RET than CALL instructions, so an attacker would have to locate a different
gadget (e.g. SpectreRSB) first to execute a transient path of excess RET
instructions.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c