[PATCH 1/5] MODSIGN: do not load mok when secure boot disabled
authorLee, Chun-Yi <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com>
Tue, 13 Mar 2018 10:37:59 +0000 (18:37 +0800)
committerSalvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
Fri, 28 May 2021 08:31:38 +0000 (09:31 +0100)
commitc70f5ad19f900c01bd4bc6555de0004a97165f50
treeb12694521a0d619c2573f30a1df32057d4b0b7c7
parent256113dffd130e032c697f0ff0fa2e3636fd9c2a
[PATCH 1/5] MODSIGN: do not load mok when secure boot disabled

Origin: https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/933173/

The mok can not be trusted when the secure boot is disabled. Which
means that the kernel embedded certificate is the only trusted key.

Due to db/dbx are authenticated variables, they needs manufacturer's
KEK for update. So db/dbx are secure when secureboot disabled.

Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Signed-off-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
[Rebased by Luca Boccassi]
[bwh: Forward-ported to 5.5.9:
 - get_cert_list() takes a pointer to status and returns the cert list
 - Adjust filename]
[Salvatore Bonaccorso: Forward-ported to 5.10: Refresh for changes in
38a1f03aa240 ("integrity: Move import of MokListRT certs to a separate
routine")]

Gbp-Pq: Topic features/all/db-mok-keyring
Gbp-Pq: Name 0001-MODSIGN-do-not-load-mok-when-secure-boot-disabled.patch
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c