x86: Introduce support for CET-IBT

x86: Introduce support for CET-IBT

CET Indirect Branch Tracking is a hardware feature designed to provide
forward-edge control flow integrity, protecting against jump/call oriented
programming.

IBT requires the placement of endbr{32,64} instructions at the target of every
indirect call/jmp, and every entrypoint.

It is necessary to check for both compiler and assembler support, as the
notrack prefix can be emitted in certain cases.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
(cherry picked from commit 3667f7f8f7c471e94e58cf35a95f09a0fe5c1290)

Note: For backports to 4.14 thru 4.16, we are deliberately not using
      -mmanual-endbr as done in staging, as an intermediate approach which
      is not too invasive to backport.

x86/cet: Force -fno-jump-tables for CET-IBT

Both GCC and Clang have a (mis)feature where, even with
-fcf-protection=branch, jump tables are created using a notrack jump rather
than using endbr's in each case statement.

This is incompatible with the safety properties we want in Xen, and enforced
by not setting MSR_S_CET.NOTRACK_EN.  The consequence is a fatal #CP[endbr].

-fno-jump-tables is generally active as a side effect of
CONFIG_INDIRECT_THUNK (retpoline), but as of c/s 95d9ab461436 ("x86/Kconfig:
introduce option to select retpoline usage"), we explicitly support turning
retpoline off.

Fixes: 3667f7f8f7c4 ("x86: Introduce support for CET-IBT")
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9d4a44380d273de22d5753883cbf5581795ff24d)